Validator rewards
Posted on Thursday 12 December 2024 Suggest An EditTable of Contents
- Validator Rewards to Incentivize Performance
- Current Problem
- Proposed Reward Structure
- Work Distribution
- Technical Implementation
- Approval Tracking
- Availability Distribution System
- Reward Computation
- Technical Constraints
- Critical Requirements
- Edge Cases
- Implementation Considerations
- Storage Requirements
- Performance Impact
- Hardware Implications
- Known Limitations
- Geographic Centralization Risk
- Network Cost Structure
- Performance Disparities
- Centralization Pressure
Validator Rewards to Incentivize Performance
Jeff Burdges from Web3 Foundation proposes restructuring Kusama’s validator rewards to align with actual operational costs and network security contributions. The proposal (RFC119) introduces an off-chain approximation protocol for reward distribution based on approval checks and availability work.
Current Problem
Validator rewards currently have minimal correlation with operational costs (bandwidth and CPU time). This misalignment particularly impacts Kusama’s scaling capabilities due to “no-shows” when validators skip approval checks. Hardware specifications directly affect the number of parachain cores, with current requirements at four physical CPU cores, though some operate with less.
Proposed Reward Structure
Work Distribution
-
Parachain Security (70-75%)
- Approval checking: Primary reward source
- Backing validity checks: Must be less profitable than approval checking
- Rationale: Most rewards should come from parachain security work
-
Relay Chain (15-20%)
- Block production and uncle handling
- Significantly reduced from current levels
-
Availability Distribution (5-10%)
- Rewards for providing data to approval checkers
- Implements tit-for-tat mechanism
-
Finality Tasks (5%)
- BEEFY proving and related operations
Technical Implementation
Approval Tracking
Validators track and report:
- Used approval votes
- Downloaded availability chunks
- Chunk distribution to other validators
The system computes medians across validators for used votes, requiring >50% honest validators for accuracy.
Availability Distribution System
- Chunk Tracking
CandidateRewards {
backers: [AuthorityId; NumBackers],
downloaded_from: HashMap<AuthorityId,u16>,
uploaded_to: HashMap<AuthorityId,u16>,
}
- Tit-for-Tat Implementation
- Validators maintain private stiffing records
- Chunk request prioritization based on past behavior
- Systemic chunks prioritized over non-systemic
- f+1 distinct chunks required per block
Reward Computation
-
Approval Rewards
- Median computation of reported approval usages
- Backing rewarded at 80% of approval value
- Early announcements excluded
-
Availability Rewards
- Reweighted based on median approvals
- Private gamma values for tit-for-tat
- No self-reporting of availability
Technical Constraints
Critical Requirements
- Backing rewards < Approval rewards
- Honest validator majority (>50%)
- Completion of started approval checks
- Efficient on-chain median computation
Edge Cases
- No rewards for early no-show replacements
- No direct rewards for backers’ availability distribution
- Small committee manipulation possible
- Whale nominator rotation effects
Implementation Considerations
Storage Requirements
- Approval usage tracking
- Private stiffing records
- Aggregate tally information
Performance Impact
- Median computation efficiency
- Message passing overhead
- Storage scaling with validator set size
Hardware Implications
- Direct correlation between specs and rewards
- Natural pressure for hardware upgrades
- Impact on parachain core capacity
Known Limitations
- Cannot prevent all strategic behaviors
- Some honest no-shows may lose rewards
- Requires monitoring for lazy backers
- Potential for preferential chunk distribution
This proposal fundamentally ties validator rewards to their actual contributions to Kusama’s security and performance. The system uses game theory and Byzantine-resistant mechanisms to ensure fair distribution while maintaining network security properties.
Geographic Centralization Risk
While this proposal moves validator incentives in the right direction by aligning rewards with actual security work performed, it introduces significant geographic centralization pressures due to fundamental ISP and networking realities.
Network Cost Structure
-
Bandwidth Cost Hierarchy(IPTx):
- National bandwidth: Base cost ~0.8$/Mbps/month
- Regional bandwidth (e.g., within SEA): ~1.6/Mbps/month
- International bandwidth (e.g., SEA to Europe): ~3.6$/Mbps/month
-
ISP Infrastructure Reality:
- Equipment costs at ISP level are similar for 10Gbps and 400Gbps ports
- Long-distance connections often get lower priority and experience throttling
- ISPs optimize for cost over performance on international routes
- Consumer bandwidth prices are largely arbitrary and don’t reflect actual costs or performance
- Very common that 10G connection is reaches those speeds within the same country speeds throttling further the distance from the source is.
Performance Disparities
- Path congestion over long distances
- ISP peering agreements and routing policies
- Traffic prioritization at international gateways
- Infrastructure quality variation between regions
Centralization Pressure
This network topology creates strong incentives for validators to locate near major European hubs like London because:
-
Technical Advantages:
- Lower latency to majority of validator set
- More reliable high-speed connections
- Better peering arrangements
- Fewer network hops to other validators
-
Economic Advantages:
- Lower bandwidth costs for similar performance
- More competitive ISP options
- Better price-to-performance ratio
- Reduced infrastructure investment needs
-
Impact on Southeast Asian Validators:
- Must overprovision bandwidth to achieve similar performance
- Pay premium rates for international connectivity
- Face inherent latency disadvantages leading to missed backings
This creates a feedback loop where validators in remote(200ms) regions like Southeast Asia become less competitive not due to their operational capabilities, but due to underlying network topology and economics. This geographic centralization pressure runs counter to Kusama’s decentralization goals and needs careful consideration in future iterations of the reward mechanism.
Given these geographic centralization pressures, Web3 Foundation’s Decentralized Nodes Program should prioritize to have sufficient amount of validators in each region or thing are likely to snowball into a situation where it makes sense to relocate to run validator nodes from Europe for optimal routes, latencies and cheap bandwidth in general.